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The objective of this study is to explain the determinants of farm and non-farm sole-
proprietorship households access to credit as well as the extent their credit constraints
impact their value of production. A propensity, kernel-based matching estimator was em-
ployed to provide unbiased estimates of the production impacts of being denied credit. Prior
research eﬀorts have used inferior methods, including the two-stage Heckman estimator to
deal with estimation issues (selection bias and endogeneity) inherent in determining impacts
of credit access and use. Results suggest that credit constrained sole-proprietorships, farm
and non-farm, have a signiﬁcantly lower value of production, but this drop in production,
when aggregated to a national level, is small.
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Credit has become a staple of U.S. households. Growth in the availability and use of con-
sumer credit over the past 40 years has been astonishing. In 1956, a little more than half of
U.S. households had some type of mortgage or consumer installment (non-mortgage) debt.
In contrast, by 2004 over 75 percent of U.S. households held some type of debt (Bucks,
Kennickel, and Moore 2006). Credit bureau reporting has brought lower prices, more eq-
uitable treatment, and more diﬀerentiated credit products to millions of households who
would have been turned down as too risky just a generation ago. The U.S. credit report-
ing system also has made consumers (and workers) more mobile by reducing the cost of
severing established ﬁnancial relationships and seeking better opportunities elsewhere. Sev-
eral other factors have encouraged broader access to credit products such as improvements
in the speed and accuracy of data processing and information retrieval, changes in legal
requirements for the collection and sharing of personal credit information, the removal of
interest rate ceilings that prevented lenders from pricing loans according to risk, and the
emergence of a wide variety of credit providers (Lyons 2003; Weinberg 2006; and Tallman
2001).
Given that credit is ubiquitous, what are the implications of credit use by a U.S. household
who owns and operates a business? Households use credit to ﬁnance purchases of homes and
durable consumer goods. They can also use it to bridge temporary drops in income. Accessto credit has direct implications for household welfare and business performance, since credit
can be used to increase the equity in the business. An individual may also beneﬁt from
mere access to credit, even if it is not borrowing, because with the option of borrowing the
individual can avoid adopting risk-reducing, but ineﬃcient, income diversiﬁcation strategies
or engaging in precautionary savings with negative returns.
A central assumption of the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis is that capital markets
are perfect, where individuals can borrow freely at the current interest rate. When capital
markets are imperfect (for example, when the borrowing rate is higher than the deposit rate
or when the credit limit of individuals is low), individuals will not be able to borrow freely,
and changes in an individual’s current income may have a signiﬁcant impact on consump-
tion. Self-employed households are unique in that they engage in the role of both consumer
and producer. Therefore, whether capital markets are perfect or imperfect drastically alters
theoretical predictions concerning consumption behavior, but production as well.
Thus, our study aims to quantify the extent and determinants of sole-proprietorship house-
holds’ access to credit as well as the severity of their credit constraints on production. In
doing so, we examine the extent to which credit use and availability issues for farm sole-
proprietorships are distinct and similar to non-farm sole-proprietorship households. It is
hypothesized that unique types of credit constrained farm and non-farm sole-proprietorships
can be identiﬁed based on a household’s demand for credit and the supply of credit pro-
vided by creditors. To the knowledge of the authors, no study has examined the credit use
and constraint diﬀerences in farm and non-farm sole-proprietorships. Examining these two
diﬀerent types of households is unique because it combines data from two nationally based
surveys: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Survey (ARMS). Since the data considers directly elicited credit constraints, we split
the sample based on the value of production for each household type and use matching
methods to control for endogenity and selection bias. The matching method we employ
validates using directly elicited credit constraints because the impact of being credit con-
strained has similar results across the two household types. The ﬁnal, and perhaps more
policy relevant objective, is to measure the eﬀect of credit constraints on the behavior and
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sole-proprietorship, farm and non-farm, has a signiﬁcantly lower value of production but this
drop in production, when aggregated to a national level, is small. The policy implications of
imperfect capital markets are wide ranging in agriculture such as the relative market distor-
tion created by subsidies to the implications for trade from decoupled payments (Burﬁsher
and Hopkins 2004; OECD 2001).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Previous studies of credit constraints
are discussed in the next section. The third section presents an empirical framework for
credit supply and demand. Data sources are discussed in the fourth section. The ﬁfth
section contains variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics for non-farm sole-proprietors
based on the 2004 SCF and farm sole-proprietor households from the 2005 ARMS. This is
followed by a discussion of the multinomial logistic regression for both farm and non-farm
household across the ﬁve distinct categories of credit use and availability. The seventh
section provides background on the method of propensity score matching. This is followed
by a presentation of the results of the matching approach to estimating the production
impacts of being credit constrained. The ﬁnal section provides conclusions and implications
for further study.
Previous Studies
The analysis of the determinants of credit constraints answers important questions in and of
itself. It also corresponds to the ﬁrst stage of many studies aimed at evaluating the impact of
credit constraints on household-speciﬁc outcomes. In order to control for potential selection
bias in the estimation of the “impact equation,” a selection model needs to be estimated.
Feder et al. 1990, Carter and Olinto 2003, and Foltz 2004 provide examples of this general
approach in studies analyzing impacts of credit constraint on investment or productivity.
For example, Jappelli 1990, Cox and Jappelli 1990, and Cox and Jappelli 1993 used the
SCF to study the characteristics of liquidity constrained consumers in the U.S. Credit
constraints can be directly observed in their micro data as the SCF provides information on
3which consumers had their request for credit rejected by ﬁnancial institutions. Jappelli 1990
shows that economic characteristics (such as current income, wealth and unemployment)
are important determinants of whether a household is credit-constrained. However, Jappelli
also shows that demographic characteristics (such as age, marital status and household type)
are highly signiﬁcant in determining whether a household is credit-constrained.
Studies that examine the existence and implications of credit constraints in agricultural
production have largely been conﬁned to developing countries or countries in economic
transition with immature markets. For example, Petrick 2004 examined credit rationing
in Poland using cross-section data in the context of the microeconomic farm household
model. He found demographic characteristics and collateral were important determinants
of credit rationing. The analysis for Poland found 40 percent of borrowers experienced
credit rationing - - obtaining less credit than they originally wanted - - while a minority of
farms were completely denied credit. Foltz 2004 examined credit access and its eﬀects on
investment for rural Tunisian households. His results suggest that the presence of credit
constraints hinders farm proﬁtability, but have smaller consequences for investment.
Guirkinger and Boucher 2005 employed a more robust deﬁnition of being credit constrained
and the impacts on productivity in Peruvian agriculture. They distinguished between formal
and informal credit markets showing that the impact on productivity of farmers who were
constrained in formal credit markets depended primarily on their endowment in productive
inputs. Blancard et al. 2006 developed a nonparametric proﬁt frontier model to asses various
eﬃciency measures of being internally or externally credit constrained. Their results indicate
that long-run credit constraints vastly decrease the ﬁnancial eﬃciency or investment of a
French farm. Thus, policy makers could use this information to design programs that would
allow French farmers to increase their access to external credit.
A limitation of the Blancard et al. 2006 study is that household preferences are ignored
when assessing whether or not a credit constraint is binding. Barry and Robison 2001
found that household preferences, in their case risk characteristics and business practices,
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the credit terms and availability of credit by a lender. Feder et al.
1990 also found that household preferences signiﬁcantly impacted the likelihood a household
4would be credit constrained and the subsequent impact on consumption and production for
Chinese farm households. Thus, our aim is to directly consider the impact of these diﬀerent
household preferences on whether or not a household is credit constrained and compare these
preferences across farm and non-farm sole proprietorships and their subsequent impact on
production.
Theoretical Inferences on Modeling Diﬀering Credit Constraints
In theory, households will pursue credit up to some credit limit if the deposit rate is greater
than the borrowing rate. This limit may be imposed by a lender or the result of self
limiting behavior. These limits may or may not be mutually exclusive. The maximum
amount lenders are willing to provide is a function of available resources and is independent
of the interest rate that can be charged and of the likelihood of default. Asymmetry of
information between the borrower and lender gives rise to the diﬀerences in these two
limits. For example, a household may not apply for credit because of the fear of denial.
Another situation where asymmetry of information exists is when borrowers wish to borrow
more than their credit limit allows. This is commonly known as credit rationing. Also,
credit rationing creates the situation where some borrowers may receive credit while other
borrowers with similar ﬁnancial characteristics do not. The potential of adverse selection
arising from the asymmetry of information between the lender and the borrower will also
discourage lenders from using the interest rate as a way to ration credit (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981). Credit limits and credit rationing inﬂuence the household’s credit decision and are
further discussed relative to the supply and demand forces that inﬂuence credit.
Supply of credit, CS, is a quantity controlled by lenders. To determine how much credit
to issue to a borrower, lenders assess the creditworthiness of a borrower. Credit scoring
models are the standard way lenders control the supply of credit by analyzing the repay-
ment capacity, solvency, liquidity, and collateral position of a potential borrower. Solely
relying on the supply of credit as determining whether a household is credit constrained
is incorrect. Demand for credit, CD, is a household’s desire to supplement consumption
5and/or investment through credit. Phimister 1995 and Jeﬀerson 1997 found that farms and
entrepreneurs, respectively, beneﬁt from relaxed borrowing constraints.
Unfortunately, CS and CD are not observable. What is observable is the total amount of
credit or debt held by the household, C. Similar to Grant 2003, we assume that CS and
CD are functions of a set of household characteristics that impact the supply and demand
for credit,XS and XD, respectively. Furthermore, it is diﬃcult to identify if CS and/or CD







From equation (1), we know that the supply and demand for credit represents the minimum
amount of credit. Thus, the decision to acquire credit and the decision to provide credit
both inﬂuence the observed C. This is an important assumption because it highlights the
importance of capturing both CS and CD when identifying the underlying determinants
and the probability of a household being credit constrained.
The classic method for modeling if a household is credit constrained is to estimate the
probability of the household being credit constrained, πi (Jappelli 1990). Typically, πi is
a dichotomous variable where a household is credit constrained when πi = 1 if CS = 0
and CD > CS and πi = 0 otherwise. This is a simplistic method of modeling whether or
not a household is credit constrained. Cox and Jappelli 1993 considered that constrained
and non-constrained households may or may not desire debt, i.e. CD may equal zero in
both cases. Therefore, being credit constrained extends beyond whether or not πi = 1 or 0
because both supply and demand factors impact πi.
Similar to Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles 1998, we consider a direct method of assessing
whether or not a household is credit constrained. Our paper extends their work by analyz-
ing diﬀerent categories of credit constrained households and then estimate and compare the
diﬀerent impacts those categories have on the value of production. To properly account for
diﬀerent credit constraint classiﬁcations, it is assumed that each situation is distinct and
observable. The ﬁve credit constraint classiﬁcations are: credit constrained, obtained credit
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credit applicants. Jappelli 1990 argues that discouraged credit applicants and credit con-
strained applicants are not diﬀerent. Therefore, these two groups comprise πi = 1 and the
other three groups fall into πi = 0. We contend that this classiﬁcation underestimates the
impact of being credit constrained on the value of production. Therefore, segmenting the
data by the ﬁve groups described earlier is necessary. The SCF and the ARMS data pose
questions that allow the identiﬁcation of the ﬁve credit constrained groups.
Data
To meet our objectives, a comparable sample of non-farm households who own and operate
sole-proprietorships and farm households relative to credit constraints must be created. The
SCF and the ARMS each contain the necessary information to construct such a comparable
sample. The SCF is a cross-sectional survey conducted every three years by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Blancard et al. 2006). The SCF provides a
wide array of household and business characteristics and uses a dual frame sample design
to improve coverage of all households in the U. S. Similar to the SCF, the ARMS data
set contains all of the necessary information to compare farm households and non-farm
households. ARMS is a complex survey design where each observation in the ARMS data
set represents a number of similar farm households or the inverse probability of the surveyed
household being selected for the survey.
Unfortunately, creating a comparable sample is not a straightforward task given the types
of questions asked in the 2004 SCF and the lack of direct correspondence between business
ownership and self-employed status (Carroll and Samwick 1997; Hurst and Lusardi 2004). In
the 2004 SCF, self-employment status results from a question asking whether the household
head works for herself or someone else. Excluding farms, there are over 12 million self-
employed households whose business owners have either an active or passive role in the
management of the business. Applying the restriction of business owners with an active
management role to the original population of non-farm self-employed further reduces the
72004 sample to 1,727 representing 6.5 million households. A comparable set of farm sole
proprietorships is identiﬁed in the 2005 ARMS with a sample of 6,870 representing 2.04
million farm households.
The 2004 SCF, similar to past SCF, directly elicits the credit constraint status of a house-
hold. The same sets of credit constraint status questions were added to the 2005 ARMS.
Advantages of this approach are that a simple, unambiguous method for identifying credit
constraints can be established for each household. In addition, the questions are designed
to capture all aspects of credit use and sources of constraints on credit access providing
a more comprehensive assessment than theoretical measurement approaches. Others have
considered the implications of using directly elicited credit constraints and found support
for using this method to model credit constrained households and businesses (see Jappelli
1990; Feder et al. 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1993; Jappelli, Pischke,
and Souleles 1998). Now our focus is on the diﬀerence between the ﬁve credit constraint
categories in the data in order to see if the groups are indeed diﬀerent and plausible.
Descriptive Statistics of the Diﬀering Credit Constrained Households
Households were classiﬁed into the following ﬁve observable situations based on their re-
sponses to the survey questions: (1) not credit constrained; (2) no debt or did not apply for
credit in the last 5 years; (3) obtained credit after multiple attempts; (4) discouraged credit
applicants; (5) denied credit. The proportions of households that use credit without issue
(group 1) are nearly identical at 54 percent for farm and non-farm proprietorships (ﬁgure
1). There were more than two times as many farm households that had no debt or did not
apply (group 2) as for non-farm proprietorship households (15 percent). Seven percent of
non-farm proprietorship households obtained credit after multiple attempts (group 3) com-
pared with 5 percent of farm households. The share of discouraged borrowers (group 4) was
substantially higher for non-farm proprietorship households at 16 percent compared with
only 2 percent of farm households. Finally, 3 percent of farm households reported being
denied credit (group 5) compared with 8 percent of non-farm proprietorship households.1
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etorship households, yield some striking similarities and diﬀerences. The average household
income (HHINC) was about $9,000 higher for non-farm proprietorship households than for
farm households, while household debt (DEBT) was nearly $36,000 higher. Discouraged
credit applicants and credit constrained households had the lowest HHINC within each
farm and non-farm household groups. DEBT for both household types who did not ap-
ply for credit in the last ﬁve years is much smaller than for the other categories. This
further supports the assertion that this group’s demand for credit is zero or near zero. It
has been well documented that farm households have more business equity (BUSEQ) rel-
ative to their non-farm counterparts. The results in table 1 are no diﬀerent given that all
types of credit constrained farm households have a higher BUSEQ. The proxy for liquidity
used in this study is the liquidity reserve ratio (LIQRES). This ratio measures how much
cash and liquid assets a household has available after paying current debts relative to its
monthly expenditures. It is interesting to note that all credit constraint classiﬁcations for
farm households have a larger amount of liquidity reserve relative to their non-farm coun-
terparts. This may be a product of precautionary saving that is more prevalent for a farm
household relative to a non-farm household (Mishra et al. 2002).
CHROFF is the combined non-business related work weeks for both the household head
and spouse. Diversity of household income sources may be viewed favorably by lenders
when evaluating credit worthiness. Farm households had much greater participation in the
oﬀ-farm workplace averaging 25 full-time weeks per year compared with 17 weeks for non-
farm proprietors. Among both farm and non-farm sole-proprietor households, the lowest
amount of labor devoted to non-business wage employment occurred for the group that
does not utilize credit and the group consisting of discouraged borrowers. Farm households
that used credit without issue (group 1) had the highest average weeks of non-farm wage
employment, while those in the group that obtained credit after multiple attempts had the
highest weeks of wage employment for non-farm sole-proprietor households.
The average years of owning and operating the business (YRBUS) is lower for all credit
constrained types of non-farm households relative to farm households. Since production
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dren, and farming has a highly specialized business operations and regulatory environment
that inﬂuences this result. Also, the age of farm household operators has been increasing
over time (Hoppe et al. 2001). This result may explain why the average household head’s
age (AGE) for a farm household is higher than non-farm households.
Twenty four percent and fourteen percent of all non-farm and farm households, respec-
tively, had a major capital purchases (CAPPUR). The largest CAPPUR for both farm and
non-farm households was non-farm discouraged credit applicants; over half had a major
capital purchase. Farm households have the highest average of household heads or spouses
who do not have a college education (COLLEGE). However, non-farm discouraged credit
applicants and credit constrained households have similar averages relative to their farm
counterparts or have the highest amount of household heads and spouse without a college
education. Fewer non-farm household heads are not married (MARRIED) while the largest
amount of farm and non-farm household heads who are not married are classiﬁed as being
a discouraged credit applicant. Finally, a majority of the sample is of a white, non-hispanic
ethnic background based on the dummy variable all other races except white (OTHRACE)
being around 8 percent for both farm and non-farm sole-proprietor households.
The means of the selected variables show that each group of credit constrained households
is unique and distinct, while similarities do exist across farm and non-farm household types.
The results of the multinomial regression model show that these diﬀerences and similarities
do indeed hold within and across farm and non-farm household types.
Determinants of Credit Use and Credit Constraints
Earlier it was assumed that πi is observable and directly impacted by CD and CS. Since
the researcher cannot directly observe the impact of CD and CS on πi, further structure
is assumed. The observed amount of C was assumed to be the minimum CD and CS;
thus, observable household characteristics, X, that impact C capture XD and XS. To
estimate πi, a multinomial logistic regression is used to compare the probability of a sole
10proprietorship falling into a credit constrained classiﬁcations to an omitted classiﬁcation.
Using borrowers who had no diﬃculty obtaining the full amount of credit requested as the









This represents the probability the ith household falls into the jth credit use classiﬁcation.
The βj coeﬃcients represent the eﬀects of household characteristics, X, on the probability
of the ith household falling into the jth credit use classiﬁcation over the omitted alternative.
Finally, estimation is for m-1 sets of regression coeﬃcients. Because of the multiple im-
plicate design of the SCF, the repeated imputation inference (RII) method was used with
the multinomial logistic regression (Montalto and Yuh 1996). Complex sample estimation
issues for the ARMS data were handled using delete-a-group jackknife procedures (Kott
1998).
As income increases for both types of sole proprietorships, there is a lower probability that a
household will fall into the credit constrained or discouraged credit applicant group relative
to not being credit constrained. This result is similar to Cox and Jappelli 1993. Statistical
signiﬁcance on debt was noted for both farm and non-farm sole proprietorships. Increasing
amounts of debt leads to a lower probability of a farm falling into the no debt or did not
apply for credit group. This is not surprising given that this group deals directly with
the demand for credit. Higher debt levels negatively impacts the probability of being in
the multiple attempts group for farm households and the discouraged borrower group for
non-farm proprietorship households.
One would expect that larger amounts of equity would reduce the probability of a sole pro-
prietorship being a discouraged borrower and the results in table 2 conﬁrm this contention.
Higher business equity is also positively associated with the probability of not having debt
or not applying for credit for farm households. A higher liquidity reserve position decreases
the probability a non-farm sole proprietorship will be a discouraged borrower or credit con-
strained. Conversely, an increase in liquidity increases the probability a farm household
11will not apply for credit. Since these two measures deal directly with business and ﬁnancial
risk, a more ﬁnancial stable sole proprietorship is more likely to not apply for credit.
Working oﬀ the farm by the household head and spouse reduces the likelihood that a farm
sole proprietorship will not apply credit. This result relates to the ﬁndings of Mishra and
Goodwin 1997. They found that oﬀ farm work is a response to farm income pressures and
a means to stabilize household income. The longer a sole proprietorship operates a business
the less likely they will be credit constrained and younger operators are less likely to apply
for credit. This result ﬁts the life cycle hypothesis in terms of debt usage relative to age.
If a non-farm sole proprietorship had a capital purchase, then they were more likely to
be a discouraged borrower. Contrary to this result, farm sole proprietorships that made
a capital purchase were less likely to be a discouraged borrower. Recent capital purchases
have diﬀering outcomes because the purchases may have exhausted unused credit capacity
and therefore lowered the borrowers perception of their own creditworthiness. However,
those with little or no borrowing experience may discover they have more credit capacity
than perceived upon the completion of a successful transaction. It is interesting that the
latter eﬀect seems more prevalent for farm proprietors than non-farm proprietor households
suggesting that farmers may be more likely to undervalue their credit capacity.
Farm and non-farm sole proprietorships that do not have a college education are more
likely to be credit constrained, which is similar to the results of Jappelli 1990. Those non-
farm household heads that do not have a spouse are more likely to fall into the obtained
credit after multiple attempts group. This may be product of fewer amounts of labor hours
available to the household, which may negatively impacts cash ﬂow. If this is the case,
this explains why farm and non-farm household heads that are not married are more likely
to apply for credit. Finally, white household heads are less likely to be a discouraged
borrower or credit constrained, which is similar to the ﬁndings of Blanchﬂower, Levine, and
Zimmerman 2003.
These multinomial logit results explain diﬀerences and similarities among farm and non-farm
sole proprietorships relative to the ﬁve credit use groups. Having identiﬁed distinct groups
12with varying degrees of credit use and credit access issues, a more fundamental question
is whether household decisions and the resulting economic outcomes measured by value of
production are aﬀected by credit use and availability. In order to properly estimate a set of
regressions to answer these questions, two key econometric issues must be dealt with: self
selection bias and endogenity. Sample selection bias or the ﬁrms with and without access
may be inherently diﬀerent, and measures of their behavior and performance may determine
the extent to which ﬁrms have credit. As made clear by the dynamic limited enforcement
models of Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004, Hart and Moore 1998, and Monge 1990, the
characteristics of ﬁrms in any point in time are the result of their previous behavior and
access to credit. Those models also imply that the value of productivity and proﬁts of a ﬁrm
determine explicitly the credit that they can obtain. Thus, anyone interested in estimating
the eﬀect of credit constraints on dimensions of ﬁrm’s behavior, must necessarily face the
identiﬁcation problem of controlling for the eﬀect of those observable characteristics on the
credit received. Propensity score matching econometric models are employed to alleviate
these two issues.
Propensity Score Matching
As mentioned previously we test our hypothesis in the context of a non-random selection
problem. In this framework, we wish to test for, and measure, our treatment eﬀect where
the observation of interest is a sole proprietorship, either farm or non-farm. The treatment
is the denial of credit in the past 5 years, and the outcome of interest is the value of
production from the business entity. This is a non-random selection process because, as we
have argued, sole proprietorships that are credit constrained are likely to have, on average,
diﬀerent characteristics than sole proprietorships not constrained and these characteristics
may alter the dollar value of output produced.
Conventional analyses, such as least squares regression model, attempt to control for these
characteristics by entering them, together with the treatment variable, into a regression-type
model that seeks to explain the outcome. But criticisms of this type of approach are now
13common. Unlike OLS, the maximum likelihood Heckman procedure controls for selection
bias by jointly estimating the outcome and treatment equations, but the procedure relies
on a joint normality assumption between the residuals. In the last decade an alternative
for improving the rigor of the statistical test called matching has gain popular support.
The procedure estimates treatment eﬀects by matching treated and untreated observations
controlling for distributional diﬀerences using conditioning variables. Such matching meth-
ods allow non-parametric estimation of treatment eﬀects, removing sensitivity to functional
form and exposing violations of the common support - cases where treated observations
are substantially diﬀerent from untreated observations. In the context of regression-type
analysis, such violations remain undetected and can result in treatment eﬀects being ex-
trapolated solely on the basis of functional form because non-treated observations that are
similar to treated ones do not exist.
Here we draw on a class of estimators called propensity score matching estimators, ﬁrst
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983. Applications of propensity score matching are
now quite prevalent in the literature, especially in labor economics where the evaluation of
job training programs represents a signiﬁcant challenge (e.g. Smith and Todd 2005a; Dehejia
and Wahba 2002). Before explaining the speciﬁcs of our own application, we lay out the
general form of the matching estimation procedure following such standard references as
Heckman and Robb 1986; Heckman 1974; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997); Heckman
et al. 1998; and Smith and Todd 2005a.
Our task is to determine the diﬀerence in the value of production between credit constrained
sole proprietorships and not credit constrained sole proprietorships while controlling for dif-
ferences in the distribution of covariates. In the evaluation literature the outcome variable,
Y , is value of production and the treatment is denial of credit, D = 1, is the treatment
indicator. Following common notation Y1 is the outcome under treatment and Y0 is the
outcome with no treatment. For any observation only one of these outcomes is observed.
Also Z is a vector of K conditioning variables which include variables likely to impact value
of production and the probability of treatment. These latter variables are the ones included
in the vector X of previous sections.
14The usual task set out by propensity score matching procedures is to estimate the average
treatment on the treated (ATT). For our problem this is the dollar value of the diﬀerence
in value of production averaged over all treated sole proprietorships. Speciﬁcally, we want
an estimate of
∆ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|Z,D = 1) = E(Y1|Z,D = 1) − E(Y0|Z,D = 1) (3)
where ∆ATT is the average treatment eﬀect. This equals the expected value of the diﬀer-
ence between the treated outcome and the non-treated outcome, conditional on exogenous
explanatory factors, Z, for the group that are treated. The ﬁrst term in the last expression
in (3) is easily obtained, as it is the average actual outcome for the treated observations
- in our case, the mean value of production from treated sole proprietorships. However,
the second term which is called the counterfactual is not observable, this is referred to as
the evaluation problem. It is the expected outcome for the treated observations had they
not been treated. The task of propensity score estimators is to deﬁne an estimator for
E(Y0|Z,D = 1), using an appropriate subset of the D = 0 data.
Matching estimators pair each treated observation with one or more observationally similar
non-treated observations, using the conditioning variables, Z to identify the similarity.
This procedure is justiﬁed if it can be argued that conditional on these Z0s, outcomes
are independent of the selection process. That is, if those observations found in the set
D = 0 were actually treated, the expected value of their outcomes, once conditioned on
the Z0s, would not diﬀer from the expected value of outcomes in the treated group. More
precisely, conditional mean independence is required, such that
E(Y0|Z,D = 1) = −E(Y0|Z,D = 0) (4)
Direct implementation of the above would be diﬃcult for a large number of conditioning
variables, yet ensuring that (4) holds would typically require a rich set of these variables.
2 Rosenbaum and Rubin deﬁned the propensity score matching estimator by showing that
15instead of conditioning on all K elements of the Z vector, one can equivalently condition
on a one-dimensional function of that vector. They show that if outcome Y0 is independent
of selection when conditioned on the Z0s, then it is also independent of selection when con-
ditioned on the propensity score which is deﬁned as the probability of selection conditioned
on the Z0s. Deﬁning
P(Z) = Pr(D = 1|Z), (5)
the treatment eﬀect in (3) can now be rewritten as:
∆ATT = E(Y1 − Y 0|P(Z),D = 1) = E(Y1|P(Z),D = 1) − E(Y0|P(Z),D = 1) (6)
In practice, (5) is estimated as a binary probit or logit, with the treatment dummy as the
dependent variable. Explanatory variables include factors that are expected to aﬀect the
probability of treatment and those that are expected to aﬀect outcomes directly and may be
correlated with treatment. The last term in (6) is illustrates the conditional independence
condition outlined in equation (4). With these propensity scores in hand there are several
ways to construct the counter factual, including nearest neighbor and kernel estimates
which we use in this study. Nearest neighbor matching compares one treated observation to
a single control observation while kernel estimates use a weighted average of all or a subset
of control observations to construct the counter factual for each treated observation.
One strength of propensity score matching is that it exposes regions in which the support of
Z does not overlap for treated and untreated observations. For example, there may be no
untreated observations with propensity scores in the range of high values of P(Zi). When
this is the case, the matching procedure is defensible only over the region of the common
support. Treated observations outside the common support are dropped from the analysis,
and ∆ATT is an estimate of the eﬀect of treatment on the treated only over the range of
the common support.
16Estimating production impacts from credit constraints
We ﬁrst estimate production impacts using the most common approach in the literature;
the maximum likelihood Heckman procedure for treatment eﬀects.
We perform a propensity score matching estimate using the ARMS dataset and the SCF
dataset separately due to diﬀerences in data collection procedures. The ﬁrst step of the
procedure requires estimation of the propensity score by estimating the probability that a
sole proprietorship is treated as a function of factors that aﬀect the likelihood of treatment
and factors that aﬀect the outcome(i.e. value of production). We drop outliers deﬁned as
observations over two standard deviations from the weight mean value of production3, we
then estimate the propensity score using a survey weighted logit model for the SCF and for
the ARMS data.
We use the multinomial logit results which verify the credit classiﬁcation diﬀerences across
covariates are used as the base set of covariates to predict the probability of treatment.
Determinants of the value of production are added to the propensity score estimator as
suggested by the theory. These include the expected sales price of the primary home of
the operator (EXPSALESPRICE), a count of the number of dependants in the household
(HHSIZE), the number of ﬂoating loans open (NUMFLOAN), the number of employees
(EMPLYNUM), and a series of dummy variables representing production speciality for the
farm data and industry codes for the business data. Additionally, we include (ACRES) and
regional dummies in the farm estimates because we have the additional data available.
We estimate the ATT using those households who received credit with no issue as the control
group and those who were denied credit as the treatment group. By not collapsing the
identiﬁed credit constrained groups, potentially biased estimates are avoided. In addition,
we expect comparisons between these two groups to exhibit the largest production impact,
an upper bound, of being credit constrained. Since we have subset each dataset to a level
where these sole proprietorships are expected to interchange household and business assets
we include several more variables to exploit the sole proprietorship’s credit situation.
The results of the initial speciﬁcations of the logit models are given in Table 3. Parameter
17estimates in both models are generally in line with expectations although the signiﬁcance
of variables diﬀer between data sets. Signiﬁcant variables from the ARMS data suggest
that being married, greater net worth(LNBUSNW), and more years in business(YRBUS)
lower the probability of being denied credit. Signiﬁcant variables from the SCF data sug-
gest that a greater net worth(LNBUSNW), more savings(LIQRESV), and more employ-
ees(EMPLYNUM) lessen the probability of being denied credit. The lack of college educa-
tion is positive and signiﬁcant in both data sets suggesting that the human capital payoﬀ of
education is capitalized in sole proprietorships. Measures of ﬁnancial well being including
household income (LNHHINC), expected sales price of home(EXPSALP), and business net
worth (LNBUSNW) are consistently negative in both models.
Before calculating the ATT, the outcome must be shown to be mean independent of the
treatment, conditional on the propensity score. Given the conditional independence as-
sumption set out in (5) above, this requires insuring the set of Z0s meet this condition,
which is equivalent to achieving ’balance’ between treatments and their controls. Several
balancing tests exist in the literature. The test we use is suggested by Smith and Todd
2005a and explained in more detail in Smith and Todd 2005b commonly called regression
based balancing. The intuition behind this test is that after conditioning on Pr(D = 1|Z),
any further conditioning on the Z vector should not provide new information on D. In
other words, we test whether there are diﬀerences in Z between the treatment and control
groups after conditioning on the propensity score.4 If diﬀerences remain, then this suggests
the propensity score model is mis-speciﬁed. Following Dehejia and Wahba 2002 we add
cross products and squares of covariates are added to the speciﬁcation until balancing is
achieved.
The balancing test assures that any conditioning power of the selected variables is removed,
i.e. pickup up by the propensity score. The ﬁnal speciﬁcations we use pass the balancing
tests when applied to the observations in the common support. The common support is
the region of the propensity scores where untreated observations exist to match the treated
observations. Recall that regression techniques ignore this support condition.
Table 4 reports the results for a kernel matching estimate using the Epanechnikov kernel,
18the maximum likelihood Heckman results, and an ATT for the traditional treatment clas-
siﬁcations. We focus on the kernel estimate since these estimates are most likely to contain
the least bias when using a global bandwidth and with the sample size of the SCF data as
suggested by Fr¨ olich’s Monte Carlo study (Fr¨ olich 2004). In the ARMS dataset we have
adequate observations to construct the counterfactual using other approaches but we do
not have a large sample from the SCF data. The bandwidths for the kernel estimates are
selected by leave one out cross validation using a range of bandwidths suggested by Fr¨ olich.
5
The columns marked “unmatched” report the full sample means for value of production by
treatment category. For example, the raw means for treated businesses from the SCF data
are $154,146 in the control group and $78,615 for the treated group. Similarly, in the ARMS
data the control group raw mean is $225,114 and the treated group mean is $163,169. The
matched weighted means are presented in the next column using the Epanechnikov kernel es-
timates. In both farm and non-farm cases the matching estimate eliminated non-comparable
observations from the counterfactual, 9 observations were oﬀ the common support in the
farm data and 2 in the business data.
The diﬀerence in means for the matched data are $44,099 for the farm sole-proprietorships
and $65,442 for businesses. In general, the Heckman procedure tends to overestimate the
treatment eﬀect while the impact based on the traditional treatment deﬁnition is smaller
in both cases, as expected. The diﬀerence between the preferred measure and the Heckman
may be due to the reliance of the Heckman procedure on functional form restrictions and
the inclusion of all observations that fall oﬀ the common support. While the diﬀerence
between the preferred measure and the traditional treatment measure illustrates a form of
sample bias present in the previous literature.
To test diﬀerences between the outcomes for the treated groups and the constructed coun-
terfactual we calculate bootstrapped standard errors. Using these standard errors, we ﬁnd
across both datasets and estimators that the treatment eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at 95%. The results from these matching estimators suggest that credit
constraints signiﬁcantly impact the value of production in both farm and business sectors.
19Aggregating these results to a national level for observations on the common support sug-
gests a total loss of output of 12 percent for business sole-proprietorships and 3 percent for
farms organized as sole-proprietorships. Output loss over the entire population of non-farm
and farm sole-proprietorships would only be 8 percent, and 1 percent respectively. 6
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study provides an analysis of credit use for both farm and non-farm proprietor house-
holds that unlike previous analysis of directly elicited questions, allows for 5 distinct group-
ings of credit use including those considered to be credit constrained. For both farm and
non-farm sole proprietor households, a majority, and similar share (54 percent) used credit
without issue. A much higher share of non-farm sole proprietorship households were either
denied credit or were discouraged enough not to apply for additional credit. The 3 percent
of farm households that were denied credit accounted for a slightly smaller share of total
agricultural production and slightly higher share of total household living expenses. The 2
percent of farm households that did not apply for additional credit for fear of denial (discour-
aged borrower) accounted for only 1 percent of total production and household consumption
expenditures. Taking the boarder deﬁnition of credit constrained to include denied credit
and discouraged borrower (as in Jappelli 1990), suggests that credit constraints do exist in
today’s production agriculture, although there are limited to only 5 percent of farm house-
holds. And, when compared to other non-farm proprietor households where nearly one in
four report having been denied (8 percent) or a discouraged borrower (16 percent), the
incidence of credit constraints in farming are much less signiﬁcant.
A propensity, kernel-based matching estimator was employed to provide unbiased estimates
of the production impacts of being denied credit. Prior research eﬀorts have used infe-
rior methods, including the two-stage Heckman estimator to deal with estimation issues
(selection bias and endogeneity) inherent in determining impacts of credit access and use.
Moreover, the speciﬁcation of 5 distinct categories or credit use allowed for a succinct def-
inition of the control group-those who willingly borrow with no credit issues. Previous
20studies collapse households who have obtained credit after multiple attempts and those
that have no demand for credit into the control group, thus confounding the comparison
and potentially biasing estimates of economic impacts. By controlling for these issues, the
empirical evidence suggests that the total U.S. value of production decreases slightly due to
farm and non-farm sole proprietorships being turned down for credit. This small decrease
is possibly due to the wide availability of credit and programs in place through the Farm
Service Agency and the Small Business Administration to assist farm and non-farm sole
proprietorships just starting or facing ﬁnancial adversity.
21Notes
1 Many other studies use the debt-to-asset ratio as a proxy for being credit constrained.
Except for the did not apply for credit group, all other groups vary widely on their respective
debt-to-asset ratio. There is not a direct correspondence between the debt-to-asset ratio and
how sole proprietorships answered the credit constraint questions. Therefore, the proposed
groupings of credit constrained households more accurately depict the credit constraint
because other factors inﬂuence being credit constrained than just leverage (e.g. repayment
capacity, character, etc.)
2We also need the additional condition that there is no single Zk or combination of Zk0s
that guarantees treatment. Put another way, for any set of the Z0s, the probability of
treatment is strictly less than 1, i.e. Pr(D = 1|Z) < 0. This must be true for each treated
observation to have the potential of an analogue among the untreated.
3Farm Data are cut at $785,339 (15% of the sample) and the SCF cut is at $672,873
(16% of the sample)
4Operationally, we regress each covariate on the propensity score, the treatment dummy,
the propensity score squared and cubed, and the propensity score, squared and cubed,
interacted with the treatment dummy. The likelihood ratio test of all variables containing
the treatment dummy equal to zero provides the test statistic.
5For kernel matching the bandwidth grid is 0.01 × 1.2g−1 for g = 1,...,29.
6Note that the estimates of supply response are partial equilibrium, not general. Under
general equilibrium procedures they would be less.
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28Table 2: Multinomial logit estimates of credit use for farm and non-farm sole-proprietorships
Coeﬃcient estimate Standard error T-value Marginal
Variable name Non-farm Farm Non-farm Farm Non-farm Farm Non-farm Farm
INTERCEPT 4 12.811 -2.968 3.981 1.954 3.218(∗∗) −1.519 1.593 -0.916
INTERCEPT 3 11.356 -3.821 3.676 4.263 3.089(∗∗) −0.896 1.156 -0.917
INTERCEPT 2 4.458 6.400 3.734 3.599 1.194 1.778(∗) -0.209 1.022
INTERCEPT 1 -2.329 6.115 2.867 2.953 −0.812 2.071(∗) -1.530 0.987
LNHHINC 4 -1.283 -0.043 0.362 0.041 −3.549(∗∗) −1.044 -0.169 -0.005
LNHHINC 3 -0.768 -0.062 0.316 0.062 −2.430(∗∗) −1.003 -0.051 -0.008
LNHHINC 2 -0.498 0.035 0.340 0.483 −1.465 0.073 0.002 0.010
LNHHINC 1 0.132 -0.023 0.206 0.063 0.639 −0.369 0.125 -0.001
LNDEBT 4 0.067 0.114 0.126 0.097 0.533 1.182 0.026 0.120
LNDEBT 3 -0.147 0.020 0.078 0.246 −1.874(∗) 0.082 -0.019 0.081
LNDEBT 2 0.040 -0.730 0.124 0.284 0.319 −2.572(∗∗) 0.018 -0.062
LNDEBT 1 -0.228 -1.508 0.041 0.159 −5.507(∗∗) −9.477(∗∗) -0.035 -0.212
LNBUSNW 4 -0.066 -0.099 0.059 0.088 −1.105 −1.125 -0.006 -0.045
LNBUSNW 3 -0.145 0.008 0.056 0.097 −2.583(∗∗) 0.083 -0.021 -0.016
LNBUSNW 2 0.054 0.035 0.066 0.259 0.813 0.136 0.018 -0.011
LNBUSNW 1 -0.026 0.554 0.055 0.178 −0.467 3.110(∗∗) 0.002 0.088
LIQRESV 4 -0.962 -0.014 0.410 0.017 −2.344(∗∗) −0.847 -0.155 -0.005
LIQRESV 3 -0.250 0.036 0.135 0.023 −1.853(∗) 1.572 0.000 0.005
LIQRESV 2 0.007 -0.010 0.029 0.048 0.256 −0.215 0.052 -0.003
LIQRESV 1 0.032 0.029 0.020 0.014 1.556 2.123(∗) 0.055 0.004
CHROFF 4 -0.003 -0.018 0.014 0.010 −0.249 −1.870(∗) 0.000 0.000
CHROFF 3 -0.024 -0.024 0.016 0.013 −1.540 −1.903(∗) -0.004 -0.001
CHROFF 2 0.020 -0.021 0.012 0.037 1.643 −0.578 0.005 -0.001
CHROFF 1 -0.021 -0.019 0.015 0.011 −1.405 −1.758(∗) -0.003 0.000
YRBUS 4 -0.078 -0.036 0.040 0.011 −1.925(∗) −3.191(∗∗) -0.013 -0.005
YRBUS 3 -0.010 -0.046 0.031 0.022 −0.334 −2.117(∗) 0.002 -0.006
YRBUS 2 0.004 0.000 0.030 0.029 0.117 0.005 0.005 0.003
YRBUS 1 -0.010 0.009 0.020 0.012 −0.475 0.755 0.002 0.005
OP AGE 4 0.011 -0.010 0.026 0.014 0.414 −0.666 0.005 -0.001
OP AGE 3 -0.054 0.024 0.026 0.035 −2.095(∗) 0.691 -0.009 0.006
OP AGE 2 -0.046 -0.028 0.027 0.029 −1.678(∗) −0.984 -0.007 -0.004
OP AGE 1 0.036 -0.022 0.022 0.013 1.613 −1.696 0.009 -0.003
CAPPUR 4 -0.264 0.522 0.679 0.384 −0.389 1.360 -0.105 0.166
CAPPUR 3 1.735 -1.287 0.539 0.601 3.220(∗∗) −2.139(∗∗) 0.299 -0.212
CAPPUR 2 0.209 -0.108 0.537 0.659 0.390 −0.163 -0.001 0.014
CAPPUR 1 -0.569 -0.193 0.638 0.325 −0.893 −0.593 -0.154 -0.002
COLLEGE 4 0.934 1.887 0.833 0.648 1.122 2.915(∗∗) 0.147 0.320
COLLEGE 3 0.745 0.168 0.629 0.987 1.184 0.170 0.096 -0.069
COLLEGE 2 -0.666 -0.157 0.538 0.684 −1.238 −0.230 -0.187 -0.127
COLLEGE 1 0.207 0.374 0.456 0.483 0.454 0.773 -0.010 -0.028
MARIED 4 -0.437 -0.230 0.711 0.628 −0.615 −0.366 -0.148 0.040
MARIED 3 0.874 0.145 0.576 0.518 1.516 0.280 0.124 0.105
MARIED 2 1.045 -1.010 0.582 0.652 1.797(∗) −1.550 0.162 -0.114
MARIED 1 -0.232 -0.950 0.551 0.387 −0.422 −2.451(∗∗) -0.093 -0.105
RACE 4 -0.183 2.328 1.168 0.313 −0.157 7.450(∗∗) -0.114 0.295
RACE 3 1.853 2.216 0.690 0.446 2.686(∗∗) 4.964(∗∗) 0.298 0.220
RACE 2 -0.465 0.256 1.090 0.681 −0.426 0.376 -0.163 -0.152
RACE 1 0.551 0.196 0.737 0.481 0.748 0.409 0.041 -0.167
* indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 0.10 levels. ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 0.05 level.
Log-likelihood function SCF ARMS
Constant only 754.28 4011592.4
Convergence 539.29 1903460.0
Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.53
29Table 3: Logit estimates for credit constrained farm and non-farm sole-proprietorships
Farm Non-Farm
Variable Coeﬃcient p-val Coeﬃcient p-val
COLLEGE 3.0909† 0.000 1.4478∗ 0.089
MARRIED -2.3756† 0.004 1.6851 0.355
HHSIZE .0092 0.934 .4327 0.576
AGE .0096 0.648 - .0935 0.294
NUMFLOAN .0729 0.495 - .1268 0.276
LNBUSNW - .3152† 0.002 - .4459† 0.005
LNHHINC - .0840 0.067 - .9475 0.454
LIQRESV .0180 0.282 - 1.5381∗∗ 0.034
LABHR - .0001 0.328 .0001 0.910
CHROFF - .0002 0.229 - .0006 0.232
YRBUS - .0711† 0.000 - .1555∗ 0.066
EMPLYNUM .0074 0.938 .0473 0.741
EXPSALP - .0006 0.661 - .0032 0.209
INTERCEPT 1.5096 0.440 20.9565 0.268
ACRES - .0004 0.186
Spec dummies /1 YES YES
Region dummies YES
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 1% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ : 10%
/1 -Spec dummies are industry codes for non-farm data
and production types for farm data.
30Table 4: Propensity score matching results for farm and non-farm proprietorships
Farm Data - ARMS
On Support Oﬀ Support Unmatched Epan
Treated 90 9 225,114 211,289
Controls 1,614 0 163,169 167,190





Non-Farm Data - SCF
On Support Oﬀ Support Unmatched Epan
Treated 16 2 154,146 148,471
Controls 154 0 78,615 83,029





Signiﬁcance levels: † : 1% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ : 10%
Bandwidth - 0.184 SCF, 0.013 ARMS
ATT - Average Treatment on Treated
31Figure 1: Distribution of farm and non-farm sole-proprietorship households by credit use
categories
32